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STUDENT NOTES
Implied Warranty and the Sale of Restaurant Food
Nothing is quite so commonplace on the American scene as
eating in a restaurant, although the housewife may deem the event
singular indeed when the breadwinner takes his family out to eat.
When this occasion does arise, let us assume that the family's small
son will order a chicken sandwich. Perchance the sandwich will
contain a slim lethal chicken bone. When Junior bites into this
sandwich, he will have bitten into a huge chunk of the Law of Sales
that stands in complete chaos among the jurisdictions and is wholly
unresolved in West Virginia. This situation, consumer versus restau-
rateur, is representative of the myriad occasions in which a restaurant
patron, or his guest, or a purchaser of food from a grocer, or the
patron's family or guest may be injured by poisonous food, or by
foreign substances contained therein. Food products liability cases,
involving wholesaler, manufacturer, retailer, restaurateur, customer,
patron, and ultimate consumer, have become so involved with the
[ 326 ]
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interplay of tort and contract principles, medieval inhibitions and
modem public policy concepts, as to weave an esoteric pattern of
fascinating confusion.
Recovery under the theory of negligence of the restaurateur
in these circumstances is highly improbable,' and so long as this
factual issue remains, with the possibility of defendant lessening
or escaping liability, plaintiff's position is considerably hampered.
Moreover, in many cases, where the original manufacturer of the
food product was negligent, and neither wholesaler, jobber, nor
retailer was negligent,2 plaintiff may have recourse only to a de-
fendant beyond the jurisdiction,' or financially the least responsible
person in the whole chain of distribution.4
Thus we come to plaintiff's other remedy, implied warranty
of fitness for human consumption. Under this theory, he need only
prove causation and trace that cause to defendant. Once these two
hurdles have been crossed, defendant is absolutely liable to the
purchaser for injuries resulting from consumption of food substance
containing impure and deleterious matter, for defendant is held to
have impliedly warranted the fitness of the food when it was sold.5
' Not only must plaintiff shoulder the burden of proof, but he has no
access to defendant's methods and facilities. In sealed container cases he
may rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Webb v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Co., 121 W. Va. 115, 2 S.E.2d 898 (1939), to raise an inference
of negligence, Holley v. Purity Baking Co., 128 W. Va. 531, 37 S.E.2d 729
(1946), although for a time it raised a prima facie presumption, Parr v.
Coca Cola Bottling Works, 121 W. Va. 314, 3 S.E.2d 499 (1939). Originally
the instrumentality had to be in defendant's exclusive control, Keller v. Logan
Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 141 W. Va. 839, 93 S.E.2d 225 (1956),
but this was waived by dicta in Rutherford v. Huntington Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 142 W. Va. 681, 97 S.E.2d 803 (1957), and the doctrine was applicable
though third-party tampering was possible, so long as it was not probable.
The court expressly so held in Ferrell v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 109 S.E.2d
489 (W. Va. 1959). Judge Haymond dissented, observing that this decision
constituted an utterly unwarranted departure from the doctrine as theretofore
applied. What further doctrinal compromises may yet develop is purely a
matter of speculation. See Comment, 60 W. VA. L. REv. 110 (1957).
It is interesting to note that no bottle case has been appealed on the
theory of implied warranty in this state, although proof of the res ipsa elements
would be thereby obviated.
2 They are under no duty to inspect or test the goods. Kratz v. American
Stores, 359 Pa. 335, 59 A.2d 138 (1948); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 402
(Supp. 1948).
3 Cf. Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385 (1932),
where the actual packer of canned corn beef was in Argentina, the first
buyer a subsidiary corporation in Argentina, the primary distributor in
Illinois, and the retailer, the retail buyer, and the consumer in Connecticut.
4 See Note 37 CoLTJm. L. REv. 77 (1937).
5 Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. App. 1955).
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It has long been the law that "in contracts for provisions it is al-
ways implied that they be wholesome, and if they be not the same
remedy (damage for deceit) may be had."' The earliest recorded
case in which a party successfully sued for breach of warranty upon
a contract theory was in 1778." Thereafter, Lord Ellenborough said,
"A dealer who contracts to sell goods of a particular description
is understood to agree that he will deliver what is commonly sold
in the market under that description."8 Thus the law developed
that warranties of fitness attached to sales though not expressly
mentioned by the parties. The one formidable obstacle remaining
is the establishment of plaintiff's position in the contractual situation
to entitle him to recovery on the warranty. This problem has im-
peded the development of the law in this field, for actions for
breach of implied warranty are tort actions in their nature, yet are
treated by the law as actions upon a contract.' The more liberal
rule of tort damages has been applied to these actions,"0 and con-
tributory negligence has been held to be a defense." It follows
that to prove that he is entitled to recovery for his chicken bone
injuries, Junior must first show that a sale was transacted, in order
to raise an implied warranty."2
Was the service in the restaurant in fact a sale? At early com-
mon law it was the rule that an innkeeper who furnishes food for
his guests does not sell the food, he "utters his provision."' 3 The
courts said that the food is incidental to the other services, and the
essence of the transaction is not a sale but a service. A minority
of American courts yet holds that food furnished by a restaurant
6 Breach of implied warranty is a hybrid and "sounds in tort as well as
in contract." Parish v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 177 N.Y.S.2d 7, 16 (Munic.
Ct. 1958). It is a somewhat inaccurate assumption that defendant's liability
is strictly contractual. Williston, Progress of the Law, 34 HARv. L. REV. 741
(1921); PROSSER, TORTS 493 (2d ed. 1955).
7 Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939);
Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938) (recovery
for wrongful death allowed in implied warranty action).
I Fredendall v. Abraham & Strauss, Inc., 279 N.Y. 140, 18 N.E.2d
11 (1938); PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 494.
9 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *165.
'0 Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Dougl. 18 (K.B. 1778).
1Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (K.B. 1815).
12 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954),
where a patient was injured as a result of a transfusion of impure blood,
held that a sale had not occurred, thus denying the patient the right to sue
the hospital for breach of warranty.
13 Crisp v. Pratt, Cro. Car. 549, 550, 79 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1073 (1640);
Parker v. Flint, 12 Mod. 255, 88 Eng. Rep. 1303 (1699).
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to a patron is not a sale.'" However, in the majority of jurisdictions,
such a transaction is a sale, and a patron injured by food may sue
the restaurateur for breach of warranty." It appears that the lan-
guage of the Uniform Sales Act has no bearing on the question,
as states holding both ways embrace the Act."6 However, the Uni-
form Commercial Code expressly provides that food furnished by a
restaurant to a patron is a sale."7 The majority holding appears to
be gaining numbers through legislation," although a number of
states, 9 including West Virginia, have not expressly treated the
question.2" The writers feel that the law should impose a warranty
upon the service of food on the ground of social advantage,2 for
otherwise the food sellers have the consuming public almost at their
mercy. Largely for this reason, other fringe areas have also been
deemed "sales" for the purpose of imposing warranties upon the
producer.2 2
Assuming then, that a sale has been transacted, Junior is not
likely to be confronted with a disclaimer of such warranty to bar
14 Nisky v. Childs Co., 103 N.J.L. 464, 135 At. 805 (1927); Yeo v.
Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shops, Inc., 83 Ga. App. 91, 62 S.E.2d 668 (1950);
Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 1027, 1054 (1949).
'15 Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918);
Zorinsky v. American Legion, Omaha Post No. 1, 163 Neb. 212, 79 N.W.2d
172 (1956); Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 1027, 1032 (1949). Incidentally, glass
particles in a glass of water breached an implied warranty of food (?) in
Sartin v. Blackwell, 200 Miss. 579, 28 So. 2d 222 (1946); and implied war-
ranty was breached by injury due to foreign substance imbedded in ice.
Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 267 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1959).
16 Restaurant service is a sale within the terms of the Uniform Sales
Act. Goetten v. Owl Drug Co., 6 Cal. 2d 683, 59 P.2d 142 (1936); Annot.,
7 A.L.R.2d 1027, 1034 (1949). It is not a sale within the terms of the Act.
McCarley v. Wood Drugs, 228 Ala. 226, 153 So. 446 (1934); Annot., 7 A.L.
R.2d 1027, 1056 (1949).
17 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314.
18 See Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 AtI. 533 (1914) overruled
by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2161c (Supp. 1953); and Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler,
173 Md. 490, 197 Ad. 105 (1938) changed by 7 MD. CODE ART. 83, §
94(1) (Cum. Supp. 1958), both to include the serving or providing of food
for human consumption by any eating establishment in the term "sale."
The original UNIFORM SALES ACT has no such provision.
19 See Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 1027, 1060 (1949).2 0 Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., 166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936), was
limited to its facts, the court expressly not then undertaking to pass upon the
liability of restaurant keepers. No West Virginia cases have been found.
21 VOLD, SALES 454 (2d ed. 1959); 1 WILLIsTON, SALES § 242(6) (rev. ed.
1948).22 Ruud, Vendors Responsibility for Quality in the Automated Retail
Sale, 9 KAN. L. REv. 139 (1960). Sale by vending machine is a sale by
description and the implied warranty of merchantability exists. Mead v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440, 108 N.E.2d 757 (1952). In a
self-service sale, the contract of sale is made at the checkout counter. Loch
v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949).
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his recovery. This is merely due to the peculiar relationship a
restaurateur bears to the consuming public, and the promotion of
his local reputation. However, disclaimer presents a serious problem
in all other implied warranty cases. The general rule is that where
a duty to the public is not involved, private parties may contract
away their negligence liability.23 Owing to the harshness of this
rule as applied to mass contracts, the courts have employed various
methods to invalidate disclaimers while adhering to basic contracts
principles.
2 4
After many years of struggling with this problem, the New
Jersey court finally cut the Gordian Knot, and declared that an
automobile manufacturer's warranty disclaimer was invalid as a
matter of public policy.2" This public policy motivation should
certainly be applied to warranty disclaimers in food sales. However,
the New Jersey case represents the first rumblings of a movement
to disallow disclaimer of implied warranty, but is in line with the
current trend toward better protection of the consumer.
26
The law on this point in West Virginia appears to be represented
solely by the federal case of Maryland Cas. Co. v. Owens-Illinois
Glass Co.,2" wherein Judge Moore held that where an agreement
for purchase of soft-drink bottles contained a provision by which
the manufacturer disclaimed any liability for damages due to de-
fective bottles delivered under this agreement, the manufacturer
was not liable for payment made to a person injured when a bottle
exploded because of a latent defect.28 No similar case decided by
23 Shafer v. Rea Motors, Inc., 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953); RESTATE-
mENT, CoNTRAcTs § 574 (1932). However, the public interest in freedom
from exculpatory negligence clauses is not necessarily limited to the narrow
field of public enterprises. Mohawk Drilling Co. v. McCullough Tool Co.,
271 F.2d 627 (10th Cir. 1959). Conditions attached to the warranty to
limit the seller's liability are to be strictly construed against the party in
whose interests they are made. VOLD, op. cit. supra note 21, at 444-47.
24 Note, 23 MINN. L. REv. 785 (1939).
25 Henuingsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960).
26 Comment, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 453 (1951).
27 116 F. Supp. 122 (S.D. W. Va. 1953).
28 Tbe court noted the exceptions to the general rule of disclaimer validity,
they being a public interest involved, and wanton misconduct. 116 F. Supp.
at 124. Significantly, there were no West Virginia cases cited.
[ Vol. 63
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the Supreme Court of Appeals has been found. 9 However, dis-
claimers have been looked upon with disfavor by the writers, for
traditional contract principles cannot cope with the mass contract,
and new concepts need to be developed.3"
Upon the further assumption that no disclaimer of warranty is
present, Junior must dispose of but one more matter, and he is in
court. But, that matter is the showing of privity of contract to en-
title him to sue on the warranty, since the food was ordered by
his father, and this matter has destroyed more than one otherwise
valid claim.' It had long been the rule that privity was essential
to allow an injured party to sue upon a warranty.3" In the majority
of cases concerning privity, the issue arises between the consumer
and the original manufacturer, who interposes the insulation of re-
tailers and jobbers.3 However, the same principles apply to a situa-
tion involving a retailer and a purchaser's guest.34
The privity requirement was abrogated in an early Washington
case in the name of protection of the public interest.35 Subsequently,
numerous courts invented a variety of ingenious legal fictions, 36 in-
cluding the pronouncements that the retailer is the consumer's agent
to buy 37 and the manufacturer's agent to sell;38 that the consumer
is a third-party beneficiary of the purchaser's contract with the re-
29 The West Virginia cases on exculpatory negligence clauses in ordinary
contracts uphold such clauses, Borderland Coal Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,
87 W. Va. 339, 104 S.E. 624 (1920), excepting public policy contravention
by dicta, Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Hines, 85 W. Va. 405, 102 S.E. 106 (1920);
however, the judicial power to hold a contract void as against public policy
is a "very delicate and undefined power [to be exercised] only in cases free
from doubt." Barnes v. Koontz, 112 W. Va. 48, 163 S.E. 719 (1932) syl. 1.
Are food for human consumption cases free from doubt?
"0Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 CoLum. L. R.nv. 629, 632, 640 (1943).
3 Dickerson, Recent Developments in Food Products Liability: Privity,
8 D.FENSE L.J. 105 (1960).32 
In 1842, Lord Abinger foresaw: "the most absurd and outrageous con-
sequences, to which I can see no limit," if it should ever be held that the
defendant who made a contract with A would be liable to B for his failure
to perform that contract properly. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109,
114, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Exch. 1842).
33 StrictLiability of Manufacturers: A Symposium, 24 TENN. L. Rlv. 923
(1957).34 Bowman v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 308 N.Y. 780, 125 N.E.2d 165
(1955).35 Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).36 Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. Rnv. 119, 153
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tailer;' 9 and that a warranty "runs with the goods" from the manu-
facturer to the consumer.40
These fictions have inspired some juggling of semantics. The
New York courts have allowed recovery where a husband was in-
jured by consuming bread which his wife had purchased, even though
the husband was not in privity with the retailer, by holding the wife
to be the husband's agent.4 1 In a similar situation, where the pur-
chaser-wife was injured, the wife was held to be acting in her own
right and not as an agent.42 Where two sisters jointly operated a
household, sharing expenses, and one was injured consuming food
bought by the other, the court allowed recovery, holding the pur-
chaser to be plaintiff's agent, though the money was shown not to
be exclusively plaintiff's, but from a mutually-created fund." Where
plaintiff's friend paid for her lunch in defendant's restaurant, it
was held that a contract was made by both parties when the meal
was ordered, the warranty arose then, and it mattered not who
subsequently paid.4" These troublesome fictions have been inspired
by the will to serve justice without overturning the requirement of
privity which, until recently, was exacted by the New York Court
of Appeals.45
The great movement toward dispensing with the privity require-
ment was precipitated by the classic case of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.,46 in which the New York court, speaking through Judge
Cardozo, held that "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reason-
ably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made,
19 Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421
(1953).
40 Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
41 Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
42 Gimenez v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27
(1934).43 Bowman v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 133 N.Y.S. 2d 904 (4th Dept.),
afj'd without opinion, 308 N.Y. 780, 125 N.E.2d 105 (1954).
44. Conklin v. Hotel Waldorf Astoria Corp., 161 N.Y.S.2d 205 (Munic.
Ct. 1957). These legal gymnastics would handily serve Junior's immediate
purposes, but they do little toward formulating a workable rule.
45 Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
However, the privity requirement was recently overruled as regards the
purchaser's family in Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773
(1961), holding that at least as to food and household goods the pre-
sumption should be that the purchase was made for all the members of
the household. "The injustice of denying damages to a child because of
non-privity seems too plain for argument."
46 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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it is then a thing of danger."47 This rule, which by-passed privity
and allowed the consumer to recover from the manufacturer upon
a showing of negligence, swept the country,48 and was extended to
include other users of the chatte 9 at the one extreme, and repairmen
who do work on the chattel 0 at the other.
Although privity was no longer required in an action for a
negligent injury, it remained an obstacle to recovery for breach of
warranty. Many states, including West Virginia, refused to raise
an artificial agency or other relationship, and paved the way for
absolute non-liability in a large area. In Pennington v. Cranberry
Fuel Co., 1 the Supreme Court of Appeals held that in the absence
of statute, the retailer does not impliedly warrant to the consumer
the contents of a sealed package of food. He only warrants that
he has purchased from a reliable manufacturer and that there is
no apparent defect in the food. After this case came Burgess v.
Sanitary Meat Market, 2 which held that the retailer is liable for
defects in unsealed packages of food. However, the Burgess case
contained dicta to the effect that to recover on an implied warranty,
privity was necessary. 3 These two cases considered together would
appear to prevent recovery from the retailer in a sealed package
case, yet bar recovery from the manufacturer in any event on an
implied warranty, except in the highly improbable situation where
privity might be shown. Surely such a blind spot of the law should
not exist. No West Virginia case has been found which treats the
problem directly. However, it appears that this state would lean
toward requiring privity were the question to be considered.
On the other hand, a recent federal case arising in West Vir-
ginia5" seemed to imply that absence of privity is no bar to an
action on a warranty. In that case, the purchaser of impure food
and members of his family were injured by food poisoning, and
sued the retailer and manufacturer. The court held that, "Whether
4 7 d. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
48 Saena v. Zenith Optical Co., 135 W. Va. 795, 804, 65 S.E.2d 205, 210
(1951).49 Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 273 N.Y. 485, 6 N.E.2d 415 (1936).50 Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950).
51 117 W. Va. 680, 185 S.E. 610 (1936), commented upon in Comment,
43 W. VA. L. Q. 84 (1936).
52. 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785 (1939), commented upon in Comment,
46 W. VA. L. Q. 348 (1939).
53 "Of course, a food seller's implied warranty does not inure to the
benefit of parties other than the purchaser." Id. at 611, 5 S.E.2d at 787.
54 Kyle v. Swift & Co., 229 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1956).
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the liability... be held to rest upon implied contract or negligence
in manufacture . .. the evidence before us was sufficient to take
the case to the jury as against the manufacturer. . . ."I' Thus, the
state of the law in West Virginia on the issue of privity is doubtful,
1939 dicta on the one hand, and a 1956 federal decision on the
other.
Among the jurisdictions which have wrestled with the problem,
a trend of increasing liberality has made itself known. A name case
in the field, Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps,56 dispensed with
the legalistics of privity altogether and, observing that it is usually
impracticable, if not impossible, for the ultimate consumer to analyze
the food and ascertain whether or not it is suitable for human
consumption, laid down the rule that where food products sold
for human consumption are unfit for that purpose, there is such an
utter failure of the purpose for which the food is sold, and the
consequences of eating unsound food are so disastrous to human
health and life, that the law imposes a warranty of purity in favor
of the ultimate consumer as a matter of public policy.
After this path had been charted, it was trod by many pro-
gressive courts. Many states, including Virginia, which had here-
tofore allowed recovery in absence of privity solely on negligence,
57
upon reviewing their standing, dispensed with privity of implied
warranty in food cases on the ground of public policy. 8 This casting
aside of privity, in effect imposing strict liability upon the manu-
facturer of food,59 has accelerated in gaining acceptance in recent
years. Dean Prosser's copious research ° has revealed that at present
seventeen jurisdictions6 require no privity in food cases by case
law and five more62 by statute, twenty-two in all; fourteen jurisdic-
tions63 reject strict liability and require privity; two others64 are
55 Id. at 889.
56 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
5 Norfolk Coca-Cola Bottling Works V. Krausse, 162 Va. 107, 173 S.E.
497 (1934).58 Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959).
5 Note, A Limitation on Caveat Venditor, 25 ALBANY L. REv. 67 (1961).
60 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1107-1110 (1960).
61 Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mich-
igan, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Texas,
Virginia, and Washington.
62 Connecticut, Georgia, Minnesota, and South Carolina.
63 Alabama, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. For New York's modification, see note
45 supra.64 North Carolina and West Virginia.
[ Vol. 63
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doubtful; and in the fourteen states remaining, 65 there appears to be
no decision determining whether strict liability exists in food sales.
If the trend toward strict liability develops into the general rule,
no food poisoning case should be treated as a "hardship" case,
66
and unwieldy fictions6 will not be necessary to the meting out of
substantial justice. However, the no-privity rule has been recently
applied in non-food cases, 6 and this fact may indicate further
liberalization of the rule.
The foregoing is not to say that nothing more need be proved
once it is established that an implied warranty runs to Junior and
that he was injured by deleterious matter in the food. If the sub-
stance which injured the restaurant patron was in fact the object
ordered and contemplated by him, he could not, of course, recover
for his injury. For example, where plaintiff orders fried chicken
and chokes on the wishbone, 69 it is clear that no implied warranty
could be invoked. Conversely, if a needle imbedded in mashed
potatoes causes injury, liability would obviously fall upon the res-
taurateur. However, the reported cases involve nice distinctions,
more subtlely drawn than these examples.
To determine liability in cases of this class, the test has been
established that so long as the substance contained in the food is
natural to the food involved, as a matter of law the food is not
rendered unfit for human consumption because of the presence of
the substance."0 The leading case of Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co. 71
6 Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming.
16 See Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P.2d
723 (1955), where it was held that the description "Boned Chicken" on the
label, together with the statement "No bones" in advertisements, constituted
an express warranty to the consumer that there were no bones whatsoever in
the product.67See Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163
(1954), where, ironically, plaintiff persuaded the court to use the tort approach
to bridge the privity gap, and the court then applied the one-year tort statute
of limitations instead of the two-year contract statute, thus barring the action.
68 Midwest Game Co. v. M. F. A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo.
1957), applied strict liability to a sale of fish food. McQuaide v. Bridgeport
Brass Co., 190 F.Supp, 252 (D. Conn. 1960), applied it to the sale of an
injurious insecticide. The present border is defined by Spence v. Three Rivers
Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958),
which imposed strict liability upon the manufacturer of cinder building blocks.
Inherently dangerous?
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set the pace in this area. In that decision plaintiff had been injured
by a chicken bone in a chicken potpie. The court felt that despite
the fact that a chicken bone may occasionally be encountered in
a chicken pie, the pie is reasonably fit for human consumption in
the absence of some further defect. The rule which has come to
be called the "naturalness test" was formulated by the court in
holding that "bones which are natural to the type of meat served
cannot legitimately be called a foreign substance, and a consumer
who eats meat dishes ought to anticipate and be on his guard against
the presence of such bones." 2 This rule in California was further
defined in a later case, 3 where the source of litigation was a piece
of bone in dressing, on a plate of roast turkey with dressing and
vegetables. The court stated that there was no substance present
not natural to the type of meat served.
The naturalness test appears to apply whether the action is
brought under the tort or contract theory. Unnaturalness must be
shown in order to establish either breach of implied warranty or
negligence. 4 The question of naturalness has also been held to be
a defensive matter, and not a matter which plaintiff is required to
prove.'5 Naturalness is usually a matter of law,7 although it has
been held to be a jury question .
7
The doctrine appears to be limited to bones natural to the
particular kind of meat served. Crab meat not being used in the
preparation of pompano en papillote, a piece of crab shell found
therein was held to be a foreign substance in that dish."8 However,
although the person who was being served an unusual seafood dish
did not know what it was, a fish bone which injured him was held
72 Id. at 682, 59 P.2d at 148.
73 Silva v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 28 Cal. App. 2d 649, 83 P.2d 76 (1938).
74 Norris v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, 79 Ga. App. 369, 53 S.E.2d
718 (1949). Particles of bone in food prepared from meat are ordinarily
expected, and its presence did not raise an inference of negligence in preparing
the food.
71 Davison-Paxon Co. v. Archer, 91 Ga. App. 131, 85 S.E.2d 182 (1954).
76 See cases cited in note 79 infra.
7 7 Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913
(1942).
78 Arnaud's Restaurant, Inc., v. Cotter, 212, F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1954).
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to be natural to the dish and he could not recover. 9 The New
York court applied the test to a non-bone case, involving natural
salt crystals which formed in canned crabmeat after the canning
process, holding that the presence of these crystals constituted a
breach of warranty of fitness."0
The difficulties inherent in the dogmatic approach of the natural-
ness test were subtlely pointed out in Brown v. Nebiker,' which
followed the Mix case82 but treated "naturalness" differently. The
court said that one who eats the type of meat that bones are
natural to ought to anticipate and be on his guard against the
presence of bones, which he knows will be there. This viewpoint
changed naturalness, a question of law, to the reasonable expectation
of the ordinary prudent consumer, clearly a question of fact.
This difference was expressly recognized in Wood v. Waldorf
System,83 which stated that the question is not whether the substance
may have been natural or proper at some time in the early stages of
preparation, but whether the presence of such substance, if it is
harmful, is natural, and ordinarily expected to be in the final product.
The emphasis was placed upon the nature of the food being served,
its preparation, and its final appearance.
The difference in result of the "naturalness" (i.e. natural to
the basic object) test and the "reasonable expectation" test is
graphically illustrated in a comparison of the Mix case and the recent
decision of Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp.4 The Mix case held a chicken
bone to be natural to a chicken potpie. The Betehia case reached
the opposite result, holding that a chicken bone is not reasonably
expected to be in a chicken sandwich. The court reasoned that the
naturalness test is weak in that because a substance is natural to
a product in one stage of preparation does not mean that it will
798hapiro v. Hotel Statler Corp.. 132 F.Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
In Goodwin v. Country Club, 323 IIl. App. 1, 54 N.E.2d 612 (1944), a
turkey bone contained in creamed chicken was held natural to that type of
meat and recovery was denied. No recovery for injurious whole chicken bone
in canned chicken fricassee, because bones are normally left in chicken as
cut uo for fricassee. Wieland v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 223 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1955).
80 Gimenez v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27
(1934).
81 229 Iowa 1223, 296 N.W. 366 (1941).
82 Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., supra note 70.
83 79 R.I. 1, 83 A.2d 90 (1951).
84 10 Wis.2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960).
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be reasonably anticipated by the average consumer in the final
product served.
Naturalness was thrice upheld recently, one case holding that
a piece of broken prune pit is not a substance foreign to prune
butter, 5 and another holding that a partially crystallized grain of
corn, contained in a package of corn flakes, was not a substance
foreign to such food.86 However, a sharp fragment of bone in a
piece of salami was not natural to the product, as a matter of law."
The reasonable expectation test was recently applied, holding it to
be a jury question whether slivers of chicken bone in chicken chow
mein were "something that should not be there."88
The few cases which treat the problem89 reveal a trend toward
the more liberal reasonable expectation test. This liberal trend is in
line with the tendency on all fronts to relieve much of the consumer's
burden and place it upon the shoulders of the party who can best
prevent the disastrous results of food that falls below standards that
are essential in this modern age of mass food sales.
The law of implied warranties in food sales is quite meager
in West Virginia.90 It appears that each point of Junior's case
against the restaurateur would present a case of first impression to
the Supreme Court of Appeals. This situation is strange indeed
when one considers that the occurrence is so commonplace and
the case law is so abundant in other jurisdictions. However, in the
event that the Uniform Commercial Code is adopted in this state,
many of these problems will be thereby obviated. The Code pro-
vides that the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed
85 Courter v. Dilbert Bros., Inc., 186 N.Y.S.2d 334 (2d Dept. 1958).
6Adams v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 251 N.C. 565, 112 S.E.2d 92
(1960).
87 Lore v. De Simone Bros., 172 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
88 Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 (1959).
89 Most cases involving foreign objects in food are more clear-cut. See
Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 121 W. Va. 115, 2 S.E.2d 898
(1939) (dead worm in plug of chewing tobacco); Holley v. Purity Baking
Co., 128 W. Va. 531, 37 S.E.2d 729 (1946) (piece of wire imbedded in a
cake); Rutherford v. Huntington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 142 W. Va. 681,
97 S.E.2d 803 (1957) (particles of glass in a bottle of soft-drink).
90See Note, Implied Warranties in West Virginia, 44 W. VA. L. Q. 206
(1938), where the writer felt that implied warranties of fitness, merchant-
ability, and quality do exist in this state, by implication and dicta from the
cases therein discussed. This was written before Burgess v. Sanitary Meat
Market, supra note 53, was decided. See also Comment, 62 W. VA. L. REv.
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either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale,9' and that a seller's
warranty extends to all members of his buyer's family or household,
and to any injured guest.92 It is felt that adoption of the Code
would do much toward achieving clarity and order in this field.93
The two provisions just mentioned would establish a sale and dispense
with privity, two matters which have prevented countless cases
from being heard on the merits.
The manufacturer of food products owes a high duty to the
public to provide food worthy of the trusting faith placed in him
by the consumer. The structure of the law should be molded to
protect the consumer in this rightful trust, and to provide the ma-
chinery by which this high duty can be enforced. It is encouraging
that the trend of codes and cases indicates a growing concern among
the courts and law-making bodies to provide the legal machinery,
and to shield the consumer of food products under the protective
aegis of public policy.
Orton Alan Jones
91 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314.
92 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318.
93 The Code also deals with disclaimer. A disclaimer negating the
implied warranty of fitness " . . . must be by a writing and conspicuous
.... " UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316. Moreover, § 2-302 author-
izes the striking of unconscionable clauses in sales contracts and § 2-719 (3)
declares "a limitation on consequential damages for injury to the person in the
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable . .. .
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